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B.: Admissibility of Wire-Tapped Evidence At Common Law
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
AmissmmrY oF WmE-TAPPED EViDENCE AT COMMON LAW.-

Wire-tapping, as a technique of law enforcement, first came under
public scrutiny when the United States Supreme Court decided the
leading case of Olmstead v. United States.' Since that time there
have been several decisions concerning wire-tapping in state courts
as well as in the federal courts. The limitations on the scope of
this article preclude a development of the federal law or that of
state jurisdictions controlled by statute, except insofar
as is neces2
sary to understand the common law of the states.
A consideration of the decisions in jurisdictions which have no
controlling statutory inhibitions reveals a fairly fixed pattern of
questions upon the resolution of which the admissibility of evidence
obtained by wire-tapping depends. These questions are as follows:
1. Does unauthorized wire-tapping constitute an "unreasonable search and seizure"?
2. Does unauthorized wire-tapping violate the privilege
against self-incrimination?
8. What effect does the Federal Communications Act3 have
upon the admissibility of such evidence in state courts?
a. Does it matter that the telephone communication involved was wholly intrastate?
b. Is wire-tapping by a state officer and disclosure of the
information so obtained in a state court a criminal
of4
fense under the Federal Communications Act?
(1) If so, is the evidence so obtained nevertheless
admissible?
4. Is unauthorized wire-tapping so "unethical" that courts
should preclude the use of the information thereby obtained as evidence?
In the Olmstead case 5 it was contended that unauthorized
wire-tapping violated the guarantees of the fourth and fifth amendments to the Constitution of the United States against unreasonable
searches and seizures and compulsory self-incrimination. The
fourth amendment provides in part: "The, right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
1277 U.S. 438 (1928); Comment, 35 W. VA. L.Q. 93 (1929); see also
"The Legal Inteligencer," December 1, 1954.
2
For a development of this law see Rosenzweig, The Law of Wire Tap-

ping, 32 CoRmL L.Q. 514, 33 id. 73 (1947).
s48 STAT. 1064, 1103, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1934).
4 48 STAT. 1100 (1934), as amended, 68 STAT. 30 (1954), 47 U.S.C. § 501.
I277 U.S. 438 1928).
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unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated.. ." The
fifth amendment provides in part: "No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." In
holding that wire-tapping did not violate these constitutional guarantees the Supreme Court stated: "The [Fourth] Amendment
does not forbid what was done here. There was no searching.
There was no seizure. The evidence was secured by the use of the
sense of hearing only. There was no entry of the houses or offices
of the defendants... The language of the Amendment can not be
extended and expanded to include telephone wires reaching to the
whole world from defendant's house or office." 6 "There is no room
in the present case for applying the Fifth Amendment unless the
Fourth Amendment was first violated. There was no evidence of
compulsion to induce the defendants to talk over their many telephones. They were continually and voluntarily transacting business without knowledge of the interception." 7 This permissive holding becomes increasingly important with regard to state court
utilization of evidence obtained by unauthorized wire-tapping, in
view of recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court indicating that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
imposes the concepts of the fourth s and fifth 9 amendments upon
the states. The Olmstead case has also proved important as an aid
to state courts in construing their own constitutional provisions.
The recent case of Commonwealth v. Chaitt0 is in point. In this
case police offleers tapped a telephone wire leading into the apartment of one suspected of gambling activities. The court affirmed
the decision of the lower court which had admitted in evidence the
testimony of the officers as to what they overheard. Concerning the
Pennsylvania constitutional provisions,"' one of which the dissenting opinion characterized as comparable to the fourth amendment
of the United States Constitution, the court held that ".

.

. the

admission... of the testimony... was not a violation of... the
State Constitution..."
The Federal Communications Act 12 provides in part:

...

no

6 Id. at 464-465.

7id.
at 462.
8

See Wolf v. Colorado, 888 U.S. 25, 27-29 (1949).
9 See Malinski v. New York, 824 U.S. 401 (1945).
10 880 Pa. 532, 112 A.2d 379 (1955).
11
PA. CoNsT. art. 1, § 8 provides in part: "The people shall be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and possessions from unreasonable searches and
seizures.. ." Article 1, § 9 provides in part: "In all criminal prosecutions the
accused ... cannot be compelled to give evidence against himself.
12 See note 3 supra.
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person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect or meaning of such intercepted communication to any person.. ." This section was construed in the case of
Nardone v. United States'3 as precluding the use of evidence obtained by wire-tapping in federal courts. Until recently the state
decisions revealed uncertainty as to the effect of this statute on
admissibility of evidence obtained by wire-tapping in state courts.
One writer had suggested that: "Both the wording of the statute
and the policy behind it indicate... that it was intended to apply
to state courts as well as federal courts."' 4 In accord with this view,
though by dictum only, is the case of People v. Kelley'r wherein
the court held the evidence obtained by listening on the telephone
of the party to whom the defendant thought he was talking, admissible for the reason that under such circumstances defendant was
not a "sender" within the meaning of the statute and hence was not
protected by it. However, in the case of Rowan v. State,16 the court
stated that the Federal Communications Act was not intended to
relate to the admissibility of wire-tapped evidence in state courts.
It seems pertinent to note, however, that this is only a dictum, because Maryland follows the common-law rule that illegally obtained
evidence is nevertheless admissible. 17 The Supreme Court of the
United States has apparently supplied the answer to this question
by its decision in the case of Swartz v. Texas.18 In this case the
defendant was convicted of robbery, and evidence of telephone
conversations of the defendant with another party, obtained by
tapping the telephone wires, with the consent of the other party,
was admitted. On appeal the defendant contended that the Federal Communications Act' 9 renders inadmissible in evidence the
records of intercepted telephone conversations without the defendants consent In holding that the act did not have such effect the
Court stated: "We are dealing here only with the application of a
federal statute to State proceedings. Without deciding but assum13302 U.S. 379 (1937).
4 Rosenzweig, The Law of Wire Tapping, 33 CoRmNmaL L.Q. 73, 78
(1947).
15 22 Cal.2d 169, 137 P.2d 1 (1943); accord, People v. Vertlieb, 22 Cal.
2d 193, 137 P.2d 437 (1943).
16175 Md. 547, 3 A.2d 753 (1938).

17 Ibid.
18344 U.S. 199 (1952).
19 See note 3 supra.
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ing for the purposes of this case, that the telephone communications were intercepted without being authorized by the sender
within the meaning of the Act, the question we have is whether
these communications are barred by the federal statute, § 605 from
use as evidence in a criminal proceeding in a state court. We think
not"20 The same rule applies whether interstate or intrastate calls
are concerned.2 ' The Court further stated: "Enforcement of the
Statutory prohibition in § 605 can be achieved under the penal
provisions of § 501. We hold that § 605 applies only to the exclusion in federal court proceedings of evidence obtained and sought
to be divulged in violation thereof; it does not exclude such evidence in state court proceedings." 22 The Court further recognized
that the Texas statute rendering inadmissible illegally obtained
evidence specifically exempted from such prohibition evidence
obtained in violation of the "laws ... of the United States."
Relying upon the decision in the Swartz case,23 the court in the
Chaitt case 24 states: "In our opinion Section 605 of the Act was
not intended to, and does not, relate to the divulging of the contents
of intercepted communications by State agents testifying in the
criminal prosecution of a State crime in a State court."
An additional problem raised by the Swartz case 25 is whether
tapping of telephone lines by state officers and the divulgence in
court of that which is overheard, is, nevertheless, a criminal offense
under the Federal Communications Act,20 which provides that a
wilful and knowing violation is punishable as a misdemeanor.2 7 In
this connection the Court in the Swartz case 2s stated: "Enforcement of the statutory prohibition in § 605 can be achieved under
the penal provisions of § 501." This same thing was apparently
recognized by the court in the case of Rowan v. State2 9 wherein
the court acknowledged that a witness who had tapped the telephone wires might be criminally liable under the Federal Communications Act. Assuming then that any unauthorized wire20
21

344 U.S. 199, 201 (1952).
See Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321, 329 (1939).

22 344

23
24
25

U.S. 199, 201-203 (1952).

Ibid.
See note 10 supra.
See note 20 supra.

26 See

note 3 supra.

See note 4 supra.
28
See note 20 supra.
29
See note 16 supra.
27
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tapping is a violation of the act, any evidence obtained thereby
would clearly be illegally obtained. So, this then raises the question of whether evidence, although illegally obtained, is nevertheless admissible. In this connection it is noted that in all of, the state
decisions herein considered, the courts followed the common-law
rule "... that the admissibility is not affected by the illegality of
the means by which it is obtained."30 The so-called federal rule,
with the foundation case of Weeks v. United States3 is contra to
the extent that it provides that evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure is inadmissible.3 2 However, as pointed out
above, the cases consistently hold that wire-tapping is not a "search
and seizure."
The proposition that wire-tapping is "unethical" apparently
stems from the remark of Mr. Justice Holmes in the Olmstead case
that wire-tapping is a "dirty business." 33 However, in this connection Professor Wigmore has this to say: "But so is likely to be all
apprehension of malefactors. Kicking a man in the stomach is
'dirty business,' normally viewed. But if a gunman assails you and
you know enough of the French art of 'savatage" to kick him in the
stomach and thus save your life, is that 'dirty business' for you?""4
West Virginia Code c. 61, art. 3, § 29 provides in part: "Any
person who 'shall wilfully or maliciously destroy or injure any of the
wires, poles, insulators, or other property belonging to any telephone ... company, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.. ." Construing a comparable statute35 the court in the case of Young v.
Young30 which concerned the admissibility in probate proceedings
of evidence obtained by clamping a radio headphone onto the
3

o Hitzelberger v. State, 174 Md. 152, 197 Ad. 605 (1938); People v.
Kelley, 22 Cal. 2d 169, 137 P.2d 1 (1943); Commonwealth v. Chaitt, 380 Pa.
532, 112 A.2d 379 (1955); see also an interesting tabulation of state views
on this question, in the report of Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 29 (1949).
1'232 U.S. 383 (1914).
32 One further exception followed by the federal courts is that any confession obtained while one is unlawfully detained, is likewise, inadmissible, without
regard to its voluntary character. See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332,
341 (1943).
3277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928).
34 8 WMoRE, EVIDF.NCE § 2184 (b)(3d ed. 1940).
S3R.I. GFN. LAws c. 608, § 75 (1938), provides in part as follows: "Every
person who shall wantonly or wilfully and maliciously cut, destroy, break down
or injure.., any.., wire... used for the purpose of transmitting intelligence
by means of... telephonic apparatus... shall be liable to indictment therefor
36 56 R.I. 401, 185 At. 901 (1936); accord, State v. Nordskog, 76 Wash.
472, 136 Pac. 694 (1913); see also Westin, The Wiretapping Problem, 52
COL. L. 1EBv. 165 (1952).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1956

5

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 58, Iss. 3 [1956], Art. 7
STUDENT NOTES

telephone wires of the testatrix, held that since no part of the wire
was damaged or destroyed; the free transmission of the message
was preserved, and the communication itself was not diverted or
distorted, therefore no crime had been committed and the evidence
was admissible. One writer places West Virginia in the category of
states that do not have legislation dealing explicitly with wiretapping, but do have broad "malicious mischief" statutes.37 He
states that "before the modem wiretapping era, a few attempts' had
been made to bring wiretapping under these statutes. In these
cases, however, the courts refused to apply them since the wiretapping involved neither damaged the wire physically nor interfered with telephone service. It is improbable that future attempts
will -be made to prosecute wiretappers under such statutes, for
induction coil wiretapping now makes 3unnecessary
even the
8
slightest touching of the telephone wires."

Assuming then that we have no controlling statute in West
Virginia, what is our common-laN# position? Our court has long
been in accord with the common-law rule that illegally obtained
evidence is nevertheless admissible. However, our court has
adopted the exception of the federal rule that evidence obtained
by an unreasonable search and seizure is not admissible. 39 In
view of the decisions that wire-tapping is not a "search and seizure"
but only illegal in the sense that it violates the Federal Communications Act, there seems to be no apparent reason why West Virginia
could not follow the majority holding in the Chaitt case. It
should be noted, however, that in his dissenting opinion in the
Chaitt case, Mr. Justice Musmanno categorizes West Virginia as
being a jurisdiction which prohibits the use of evidence obtained
by wire-tapping. 40 This writer has been unable to find any West
Virginia decision that will support this conclusion.
J. K. B.
37

Westin, supra note 36, at 181-182.
38 Ibid.
39"We subscribe to the general doctrine that the admissibility of evidence
is not affected by the illegality of the means by which it is secured; but where
the evidence is secured by an illegal search'or seizure in violation of the Constitution, the article so seized as well as the information so illegally obtained is
inadmissible upon a trial of the accused." State v. Wills, 91 W. Va. 659, 677,

114 S.E. 261 (1922).
40380 Pa. 532, 112 A.2d 379, 392 (1955).

Cited as authority for this

statement is the "Legal Intelligencer," December 1, 1954. An examination of
this publication reveals the presence of this statement in a published report of
a committee of the Philadelphia Bar Association. No authority is cited in this
report to support such a conclusion.
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